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STEEL INDUSTRY WATCH OUT!
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL IS LURKING
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, there has been a decline of steel manufactur-
ing in the United States.' This decline has devastated the people
and communities which rely on the steel industry.2 For example, in
the early 1980s, five steel mills shut down in the Monongahela Val-
ley, Pennsylvania causing thirty thousand people to lose their jobs.3
In such communities, townspeople hoped that recent increases in
the steel industry's competitive edge would bring back or save their
jobs.4 These hopes, however, diminished in December of 1997 with
1. See Robert J. Grow, Flexibility Needed to Apply Trade Laws (visited Mar. 25,
1999) <http://204.243.31.49/cgi-win/csear... %2ecom%2ffeatures%fNS9810sf%2
ehtm> (discussing current crisis in United States steel industry in relation to
1970s). The United States steel industry suffered a downward trend during the
1970s and early 1980s due to depression and massive steel imports from other
countries. See id. During that period, approximately one-third of America's steel-
making facilities permanently closed, resulting in hundreds of thousands of lost
jobs. See id. A significant part of the remainder of the industry went bankrupt. See
id.; see generally John Schriefer, Steel Town America (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://
204.243.31.49/cgiwin/csear.. .el%2ffeatures%f0996F5%2eHTM> (discussing de-
cline in production of steel in United States); Paul Magnusson & Peter Galuszka,
Steel Imports: The Plot's The Same, But Times Have Changed (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
<http://www.business-week.com/bwdaily/dnflash/dec1998/nf8l21Oa.htm> (dis-
cussing downward trend in production in United States steel industry occurring in
1980s); Cesca Antonelli, In Steelmaking, coke isn't it so what is? (visited Mar. 29, 1999)
<http://www.amcity.com/pittsburgh/stories/1997/08/25/focusl.html> (discuss-
ing closure of 150 blast furnaces in United States since 1970s); Statement ofPhillip E.
Casey Steel Manufactures Association (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.house.gov/
visclosky/casey.htm> (discussing history of steel industry); Steel: What the Future is
Made of (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.steel.org/future.htm> (comparing to-
day's steel industry in United States with 1970s and 1980s steel industry).
2. See Schriefer, supra note 1 (discussing economic impacts on communities
where steel mills closed). The decline of steelmaking in Pennsylvania's Mononga-
hela Valley (the Valley) is one example of how the closure of a steel plant can
devastate families and the communities. See id. In the 1980s, five steel facilities
shut down in the Valley, causing majorjob loss. See id. What was once a town filled
with retail stores, schools, and working families is now a ghost town. See id. The
town population has decreased from 16,000 to 4,500 since 1950, the schools and
stores closed, and the average family income is currently a low $21,000. See id. The
main street of the town, which was once a major shopping district, is now mostly
boarded up stores. See id. Crime and gangs have also entered the streets. See id.
3. See id. (describing loss ofjobs and effects on community in Valley as result
of closure of various steel mills).
4. See Steel: What the Future is Made of supra note 1 (discussing United States'
recent comeback in market place and its effect on steel industry in United States
today). The United States steel industry invested over $50 billion in new facilities
and technologies to become more competitive in the global market. See id. Since
(161)
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the enactment of the Kyoto Protocol (the Protocol). 5 The Protocol
is an environmental treaty that requires mandatory emission reduc-
tions for the United States but exempts developing international
countries. 6
This Comment examines the effects the Protocol will have on
the United States steel industry if the agreement is ratified by the
Senate. Part II will provide a background of environmental con-
cerns, the cause of these concerns, the method of making steel, and
the environmental steps the steel industry has taken to make the
production of steel environmentally friendly.7 Part III examines
the events surrounding the creation of the Protocol, the Protocol
itself, the ratification debate within the United States, and the
events subsequent to the enactment of the Protocol.8 Part IV exam-
ines the effect the Protocol will have on the American steel indus-
try.9 Finally, Part V concludes with an examination of the changes
that should be made to the Protocol. 10
II. BACKGROUND
A. Greenhouse Effect Generally
The greenhouse effect is a natural phenomenon that occurs in
the troposphere.'" It begins when ultraviolet radiation travels from
1982, labor productivity has doubled. See id. In 1995, labor productivity was 3.9
man hours per finished ton. See id. The steel mills in the United States today are
more competitive than those in Japan and Germany. See id.; see also AISI Testimony
(visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.steel.org/policy97/chb5197.htm> (discussing
increase in productivity of steel in United States).
5. For a discussion of the Kyoto Protocol's effect on the United States steel
industry, see infra notes 156-90 and accompanying text.
6. For a complete discussion of the Kyoto Protocol, see infra notes 59-138 and
accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 11-48 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 49-155 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 156-90 and accompanying text.
10. See infta notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
11. See Peter G. Sparber & Peter E. O'Rourke, Understanding the Kyoto Protocol:
A Comprehensive Citizen's Guide to the Scientific and Political Issues Surrounding the
United Nations Treaty and Global Warming, BRIEFLY.. .PERSPECTIVES ON LEGIS., REG.,
& LITIG., Apr. 1998, at 2 (describing natural phenomenon greenhouse effect).
The troposphere is the layer that is the closest to the Earth's surface. See id. It
extends to an altitude of approximately 40,000 feet. See id. at 33. "The tropo-
sphere is also called the 'weather sphere', because it is where weather as we know it
occurs." Id. at 2; see also EILLEEN CLAUSSEN & LISA McNEILLY, EQUITY & GLOBAL
CLIMATE: THE COMPLEX ELEMENTS OF GLOBAL FAIRNESS 2 (1998) (describing green-
house effect and its negative effect on environment); THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND
THE PRESIDENT'S POLICIES TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE: ADMINISTRATION Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS 15 (July 1998) (on file with the Villanova Environmental LawJour-
nal) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S POLICIES] (discussing necessity and history of
2
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the sun, through the atmosphere, to the Earth. a2 The Earth ab-
sorbs some of this ultraviolet radiation and releases the remaining
radiation back into space in the form of infrared energy.13 Green-
house gases absorb much of this infrared energy.14 This entire pro-
cess is called the greenhouse effect.' 5 The greenhouse effect
prevents too much infrared energy from escaping into space and
keeps the Earth's temperature warm enough to sustain life. 16
Many scientists warn that excess emissions of greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere accelerates the greenhouse effect.' 7 The ex-
cess emission of greenhouse gases decreases the amount of infrared
energy released into space and traps more infrared energy in the
Earth's troposphere.1 8 The trapping of infrared energy increases
greenhouse effect); United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteoro-
logical Organization, Common Questions About Climate Change (visited Jan. 31, 2000)
<http://www.gcrio.org/ipcc/qa/cover.html> (discussing causes of climate change
and its relation to greenhouse effect).
12. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 2 (describing process of radia-
tion passing through atmosphere). For additional authorities, see supra note 11.
13. See id. (discussing infrared energy released from Earth as part of green-
house phenomenon).
14. See id. (discussing process of infrared energy as part of greenhouse effect).
15. See id. (defining greenhouse effect and entire process). The greenhouse
effect is a natural process by which some of the radiant heat from the sun is cap-
tured in the lower atmosphere of the Earth, thus maintaining the temperature of
the Earth's surface. PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 1. Without the green-
house effect, the Earth would be "unhabitable for life" because the temperature
would be approximately 60'F cooler. See id. at 15. "[T]he Earth would more
closely resemble the cold, lifeless planet Mars." Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note
11, at 2.
16. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing essentiality of
greenhouse effect so Earth's temperature is habitable). Some of the infrared en-
ergy bypasses the greenhouse gases and escapes directly into space. See id. The
following interacting processes provide for the escape of infrared energy: cloud
formation, rainfall, and currents. See id. The greenhouse effect causes some of the
infrared energy to escape into space to keep the Earth's temperature warmer. See
id. If all of the infrared energy escaped the Earth's atmosphere, the Earth's tem-
perature would be too cold to sustain life. See id.
17. See id. (describing acceleration of greenhouse effect due to increase emis-
sion of greenhouse gases); PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 1 (attributing
warming of Earth's surface to accumulation of greenhouse gases). Some studies
claim that the data supporting such conclusions are "uncertain science". See
Chauncey Starr et al., It's Time to Move Beyond Kyoto (visited Feb. 1, 1999) <http://
www.marshall.org/pre-sletter.htm> (warning against heavy reliance on reports at-
tributing Earth's warming to emissions of greenhouse gases because of methods
utilized in studies).
18. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing excess emission of
greenhouse gases and its effect on climate change). The increase in emission of
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the Earth's temperature and causes abrupt changes in the weather,
such as floods, hurricanes, droughts, and higher sea levels. 19
The gases contributing to the greenhouse effect are: (1) car-
bon dioxide, (2) methane, (3) nitrous oxide, (4) hydrofluoro-
carbons, (5) perfluorocarbons, and (6) sulfur hexafluoride. 20
While both human activity and natural causes can create the first
19. See id. at 3 (discussing greenhouse effects on weather); Energy Informa-
tion Administration, Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic
Activity, SR/OIAF/98-03, at 1 (Oct. 1998) (discussing anticipated effects of green-
house gases on global climate, sea levels, agricultural patterns, and ecosystems);
PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 15 (contributing Earth's warmer tempera-
ture to emissions of greenhouse gases). Recent studies indicate several green-
house effects: (1) there was a one degree increase in the global temperature, (2)
1997 was the warmest recorded year, (3) "nine of the past eleven years have been
the warmest on record," and (4) in the present decade, the Northern Hemisphere
experienced its three warmest years since 1400. See PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra
note 11, at 17.
Some scientists claim that the increase in temperature is not conclusive be-
cause the temperatures around the world are different and it is difficult to distin-
guish between normal fluctuations and permanent temperature changes. See
Energy Information Administration, supra, at 1; see also Sparber & O'Rourke, supra
note 11, at 3 (noting some scientists are skeptical that climate change is actually
occurring and other scientists believe that if it is occurring, it will not harm Earth).
"Regardless of these scientific disputes, a majority of governments have expressed
their belief in climate change and their desire to stop it." Sparber & O'Rourke,
supra note 11, at 3.
Natural events can cause short term changes in the Earth's climate. See
United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological Organization,
supra note 11, at 5. For example, volcanic eruptions release tiny particles in the air
that block sunlight and, thus, cause surface cooling for several years. See id. "Varia-
tions in ocean currents change the distribution of heat and precipitation." Id. Pe-
riodic warming of the central and eastern Pacific Ocean typically cause severe rains
in some regions and serious droughts in other areas that may last for one to two
years. See id.
Natural events can also cause long term climate changes. See id. "[N]atural
changes in the geographical distribution of energy received from the sun and the
amounts of greenhouse gases and dust in the atmosphere have caused the climate
to shift from ice ages to relatively warmer periods." Id. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts a 6-37 inch rise in sea level by 2100. See
PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 19. A rise in sea level "would result in sub-
stantial loss of coastal land in the United States especially along the southern At-
lantic and Gulf Coasts." Id. The increased frequency and intensity of storms and
severe weather changes may cause loss of property and loss of human and animal
lives. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 3. There may also be an increase
in the number of forest fires and aggressive disease-carrying insects. See id. The
climate change may also cause the "spread of diseases such as malaria, yellow fever,
encephalitis, and cholera." Charlotte Booncharoen & John Gase, International
Commitment Toward Curbing Global Warming: The Kyoto Protocol, 4 ENVTL. LAw. 917,
918 (June 1998). However, some scientists claim that these weather changes are
beneficial to the Earth because "[g]rowing seasons would be longer and harsh
winters more subdued." Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 3; see also Energy
Information Administration, supra, at 1 (predicting potential impacts of increasing
emissions of greenhouse gases on global climate and ecosystems).
20. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 3 (listing major gases contribut-
ing to greenhouse effect).
4
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol11/iss1/5
KYOTO PROTOCOL
three of these gases, only human activity creates the last three.2'
Carbon dioxide is the most pervasive among the gases and, there-
fore, will be the major focus of the discussion.
B. Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the United States
The man-made form of carbon dioxide poses the greatest envi-
ronmental threat because it comprises the majority of all green-
house gas emissions. 22 "Carbon dioxide is produced when coal, oil,
and natural gas (fossil fuels) are burned to produce energy used for
transportation, manufacturing, heating, cooling, electricity genera-
tion, and other applications." 23 The burning of fossil fuels accounts
for ninety-eight percent of all carbon dioxide emissions in the
United States.24 Industrial growth occurring since the 1950s in-
creased carbon dioxide emissions dramatically. 25 This increase in
21. See id. at vii (designating greenhouse gases that occur naturally and those
which occur as a result of human activity). The burning of fossil fuels accounts for
80% of carbon dioxide emissions. See id. at 4. Electricity production and most
forms of transportation are common sources of carbon dioxide. See id. Agricul-
tural practices, such as application of commercial fertilizer, constitutes the primary
source of nitrous oxide emission. See id. "When nitrogen-based fertilizers ... are
applied to crops, some of the nitrogen is absorbed into the soil where it undergoes
either nitrification or de-nitrification processes. This means that the nitrogen
breaks down, combines with oxygen and forms nitrous oxide - which is then re-
leased into the atmosphere." Id. The sources for methane are landfills and agri-
cultural practices. See id.
Hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride are only
emitted through human activity. See id. at 5. Hydrofluorocarbons are a substitute
for ozone-layer-depleting chlorofluorocarbons used in automobile air condition-
ers. See id. Manufacturing activities produce perfluorocarbons. See id. Sulfur hex-
afluoride is an insulator in electrical transmission and distribution systems. See id.
22. See id. (estimating carbon dioxide comprises majority of greenhouse gas
emissions).
23. United Nations Environment Programme & World Meteorological Organ-
ization, supra note 11, at 11. "The use of fossil fuel currently accounts for 80 to
85% of the carbon dioxide being added to the atmosphere." Id. There are other
activities that cause the emission of carbon dioxide. See id. For example, land use
changes cause 15-20% of the current emissions of carbon dioxide. See id. For a
discussion of carbon dioxide sources, see supra note 21.
24. See PRESIDErr's POLICIES, supra note 11, at 5 (estimating percentage of
carbon dioxide produced in United States); see also CLAUSSEN & McNEILLY, supra
note 11, at 4 (asserting that 85% of greenhouse gas emission in United States is
due to burning of fossil fuels to provide energy).
25. See PRESIDENT'S PoLICIES, supra note 11, at 5-6 (comparing increase in car-
bon dioxide emissions to increase in industrial output). The United States more
than doubled its emissions since 1950. See id. at 5. Experts note that emissions
output tracks a nation's economy. See id. at 6. This tracking occurs because there
is a close link between the growth of a country's economy and its energy use (burn-
ing of fossil fuels). See CLAUSSEN & McNEILLY, supra note 11, at 4. "As income
increases, more energy is used to produce goods and services, and personal energy
use increases. Consequently, as economies grow, emissions of greenhouse gases
increase." Id. Japan and the nations of the former Soviet Union provide illustra-
2000]
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carbon dioxide emission is expected to climb even further if the
United States does not enact a reduction policy. 26 The leader in
carbon dioxide emissions, the United States, is responsible for
twenty-five percent of emissions world wide. 27
C. United States Steel Industry Generally
1. Process of Making Steel
The production of steel relies heavily on fossil fuels like coal,
natural gas, and petroleum to provide the necessary energy.2s Coal
tions of a direct correlation between a country's economy and its carbon dioxide
emissions. See PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 6. After World War II, Ja-
pan's emission increased with the country's rapid development. See id. On the
other hand, the nations of the former Soviet Union experienced a decline in emis-
sions as well as a "significant fall in economic output during their transitions to
market economies." Id.
The relationship between the economy and carbon emissions can be compli-
cated. See CLAUSSEN & McNEILLY, supra note 11, at 5. There are four major factors
illustrating the relationship between the economy and carbon emissions "(1) the
relationship between overall energy use and economic growth, (2) the relative use
of different energy sectors (e.g. electricity versus traditional fuels), (3) changes in
the efficiency and the intensity of energy use, and (4) the relative carbon intensity
of fuels sources." Id. Natural gas and nuclear power usage have decreased the
carbon intensity of energy. See id. For example, the use of nuclear power caused
the French economy to increase while the carbon emissions lagged behind. See id.
Brazil has accomplished the same goal with the use of hydropower. See id.
26. See PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 5 (predicting an increase in
future emissions likely in United States). The Energy Information Administration
claims that emissions in developed countries will grow if regulations are not im-
posed. See id. at 9. The Energy Information Administration further claims that the
United States will have the largest increase in emission rates over the 1990-2020
period. See id. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are expected to expe-
rience growth, but not of the same magnitude as the United States. See id. Be-
tween 2015 and 2020, it is estimated that the developing countries will surpass the
developed countries in the amount of emissions. See id. For example, China is
expected to surpass the United States and become the world-leader in carbon di-
oxide emissions. See id. at 12. China's increase in emissions will most likely be
attributed to its rapid growth and reliance on coal. See id. This increase in emis-
sions from developing countries, as well as developed countries, will contribute
further to the greenhouse problem. See id. at 13.
27. See id. at 7-8 (describing quantities of carbon dioxide emissions from in-
dustrial countries). The developed countries emit the majority of carbon dioxide.
See id. They account for 64% of total carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels.
See id. at 8 fig. 3. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are responsible for
14% of total carbon dioxide emissions. See id. Among the developing countries,
China accounts for 13% of the carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combus-
tion. See id.
28. See Telephone Interview with Robert Hoover, Vice President Labor and
Safety, Kvaerner Songer, Inc. (Mar. 22, 1999) (discussing production of steel and
its reliance on fossil fuels); see also Global Climate Change (visited Feb. 10, 1999)
<http://wwww.steel.org-/policy97/environment/climate.html> (discussing utiliza-
tion of fossil fuels in steel production and its resulting emissions of carbon
dioxide).
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comprises sixty percent of the energy used to produce steel and it
emits more carbon dioxide than the burning of other fossil fuels.29
Coal is used: (1) in the coke process, (2) to provide heat in the
production of pig iron, and (3) in coal-based power plants to gener-
ate electricity, which comprises another ten percent of the energy
base.30 Currently, there is no feasible alternative to the use of coal
or coal-based fuels in steel production. 31
The complicated process of making steel begins with the pro-
duction of coke.32 Coke results from the burning of coal at very
high temperatures in the absence of air.33 After the coke is pro-
duced, it is placed in a blast furnace with limestone and iron ore to
produce pig iron.3 4 Coke is important because it contains the car-
29. See Global Climate and Steel (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.steel.org/
policy97/environ-ment/climate.html#17> (declaring coal as main source in pro-
duction of steel). Coal combustion gives rise to more carbon dioxide per energy-
unit than any other fossil fuel. See id. For a discussion of the usage of coal, see
infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
30. See Telephone Interview with Bruce A. Steiner, Vice President of Environ-
ment and Energy, American Iron and Steel Institute (Mar. 24, 1999) (discussing
various uses of coal in production of steel); Telephone Interview with Robert Hoo-
ver, supra note 28 (discussing coal usage in production of steel).
31. See Telephone Interview with Bruce A. Steiner, supra note 30 (claiming no
alternative to coal exists in production of steel); Telephone Interview with Robert
Hoover, supra note 28 (asserting no feasible alternative to coal currently exists to
provide necessary energy in production of steel); Global Climate and Steel, supra note
29 (noting lack of feasible alternatives to coal). All technology emerging to re-
place coal is dependent on fossil fuels and many are coal-based fossil fuels. See id.
32. See ASSOCIATION OF IRON & STEEL ENGINEERS, THE MAKING, SHAPING AND
TREATING OF STEEL 2, fig. 1-1 (William T. Lankford, Jr. et al. eds., Herbik & Held
10th ed. 1985) (diagraming principal process involved in converting raw materials
into finished mill products, excluding coated products, in steelmaking).
33. See id. at 141 (describing coking process). Coal is comprised of organic
compounds. See id. It is made "up principally of the remains of vegetable matter
which has been partially decomposed in the presence of moisture and the absence
of air and subjected to variations in temperature and pressure." Id. The principal
elements of coal are carbon and hydrogen. See id. It also contains oxygen,
sulphur, nitrogen, and ash. See id. The coal's chemical compound becomes unsta-
ble when heated at a high degree and in the absence of air the "organic mole-
cule(s) break down to yield gases, together with liquid and solid organic
compounds of lower molecular weight and relatively nonvolatile carbonaceous re-
side (coke)." Id.
Not all types of coal will produce. See id. The composition of coke depends
upon (1) the temperature at which it is carbonized and (2) the quality of coal
used. See id. There are three types of coke: high, medium and low temperature.
See id. Coke used for metallurgical purposes must be produced at high tempera-
tures of approximately 1650-2000'F. See id.
34. See id. at fig. 1-1 (illustrating production of steel by use of flow chart). The
production of a metric ton of pig iron requires 1.7 metric tons of iron or other
iron-bearing materials, 450 to 650 kilograms of coke and other fuels, 250 kilograms
of limestone, and 1.6 to 2.0 metric tons of air. See id. at 541.
2000]
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bon needed to convert iron-bearing materials to pig iron.35 The
resulting pig iron is a major component of steel because it contains
over ninety percent iron.36 Indeed, the production of pig iron ac-
counts for two-thirds of the total energy used in the entire steel
production process.37
The pig iron is then placed in a steelmaking furnace to remove
the excess carbon. 38 After the steel has attained the desired chemi-
cal composition, it is poured from the steelmaking furnace into a
ladle from where the steel is either: (1) poured into molds, where it
solidifies to form ingots, or (2) poured into a continuous casting
machine. 39 Next, the solid steel is reheated and rolled into
shapes.40 Steel is rolled into one of three shapes: (1) blooms, (2)
35. See id. at 1 (describing importance of coke in steelmaking due to its high
level of carbon). Coke is defined as the "residue from the destructive distillation
of coal." Id. It has four functions: (1) to provide the necessary heat for smelting,
(2) to provide the chemical reactants, carbon and carbon monoxide, needed for
reducing the iron ore, (3) to supply the carbon that dissolves the hot metal and
(4) to provide the structural strength needed at the melting temperatures to keep
the unmelted burden materials from falling into the hearth. (A hearth is the lower
portion of the blast furnace where the metal and slag collect). See id. at 543-44.
"The blast furnace is a tall shaft-type furnace with a vertical stack superim-
posed over a crucible-like hearth." Id. at 541. Iron-bearing materials are placed in
the top of the blast furnace, then a blast of heated air is introduced through open-
ings at the bottom. See id. During this process, the iron absorbs 1-4.5% of carbon.
See id. at 1. Iron-bearing materials, such as ore, sinter, and pellets, are used to
supply the iron which accounts for 93-94% of pig iron. See id. at 541.
36. See id. at 540 (explaining importance of pig iron in steelmaking because
of its containment of carbon). The term derives from the "old-fashioned method
of casting blast-furnace iron into molds arranged in sand beds in such a manner
that they could be fed from a common runner." Id. The individual pieces of iron
were referred to as pigs because they resembled a litter of suckling pigs and the
runner was referred to as a sow. See id. There are different kinds and grades of pig
iron. See generally id. (discussing blast furnaces' production of different kinds and
grades of pig iron).
37. See Telephone Interview with Bruce A. Steiner, supra note 30 (stating ma-
jority of energy cost in production of steel is process of producing pig iron). Bruce
Steiner, Vice President of Environmental and Energy of American Iron and Steel
Institute, claims that the smelting process comprises two-thirds of the total energy
cost. See id. Due to coke's chemical composition, coke provides the necessary en-
ergy. See id.
38. See AssOCIATION OF IRON & STEEL ENGINEERS, supra note 32, at 1 (discuss-
ing purpose of placement of pig iron in steelmaking furnace). Industry experts
recognize three steelmaking furnaces utilized in the United States. See id. Accord-
ing to Robert Hoover, Vice President of Labor and Safety at Kvaerner Songer, Inc.,
there are only two types of steelmaking furnaces today: basic oxygen and electric
arcs. See Telephone Interview with Robert Hoover, supra note 28. Robert Hoover
claims that there are no longer open-hearth furnaces in the United States. See id.
39. See AssOcIATION OF IRON & STEEL ENGINEERS, supra note 32, at 2 fig. 1-1
(indicating steelmaking steps following steel reaching desired chemical composi-
tion in steelmaking furnace).
40. See id. at 1 (explaining final steps in production of steel). The steel is
reheated in heating furnaces. See id. at 2 fig. 1-1.
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billets, or (3) slabs. 41 Finally, through mechanical treatment, the
blooms, billots, and slabs are produced into finished steel products,
such as: bars, plates, structural shapes, rails, wire, tubular products,
and coated and uncoated sheet steel. 42
2. The United States Steel Industry's Effective Response to
Environmental Concerns
Because of its reliance on fossil fuels, the steel industry has
greatly contributed to the emission of greenhouse gases - specifi-
cally, carbon dioxide. 43 In response to various environmental con-
cerns, the United States steel industry invested seven billion dollars
in the past twenty years for production improvements. 44 This fund-
ing resulted in a twenty-eight percent emission reduction of carbon
dioxide, ninety-one percent emission reduction of toxic wastewater,
ninety-five percent recycling rate for water used in steelmaking, and
forty-five percent increase in energy conservation. 45 As a result, the
41. See id. at 1 (stating steel is rolled into three shapes after steel is poured
from steelmaking furnace). Blooms, slabs, and billots form the starting material
for the production of the finished steel products. See id. Thus, blooms, slabs, and
billots are commonly referred to as semifinished steel. See id.
42. See id. (describing various types of finished steel products produced in
steelmaking process).
43. See Telephone Interview with Robert Hoover, supra note 28 (discussing
history of environmental concerns facing steel industry due to its high emission of
greenhouse gases).
44. See Steel: The Green Choice (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.steel.org/
facts/factpagel.html> (discussing United States steel industry's efforts to make
steelmaking more environmentally friendly). In the past twenty years, the steel
industry made progress in four general areas: (1) emission reduction, (2) energy
efficiency, (3) development and implementation of new technology, and (4) mar-
ket development. See Global Climate and Steel, supra note 29. To reduce emissions,
steel companies recycled iron-bearing dust and sludges. See id. The recycling re-
duced the amount of "virgin iron ore necessary to produce steel and the energy
associated with that step" of the steelmaking process. Id. The industry also re-
cycled scrap metal and ironmaking slags which decreased the amount of energy
used. See id. The production of steel from raw materials used more energy than
other sources. See id. Steel companies took steps to move toward more continuous
processing that would decrease the cost of energy. See id. The industry also in-
vested in new technology that resulted in a waste oxide smelting process which
allows for more waste materials to be used. See id.; see also Steek The Environmental
Choice (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.steel.org/facts/environ.html.> (estimat-
ing steel industry in North America invested $10 billion in environmental
improvements).
45. See Steel: The Green Choice, supra note 44 (noting voluntary environmental
improvements steel industry made in recent years). In the past decade alone, the
steel industry's energy consumption decreased more than thirty-percent. See id.
The steel industry's dedication to improving the quality of the environment has
carried over into other industries. See id. The steel industry's biggest customer,
the automobile industry, now produces more fuel efficient cars because of the
steel industry's development of stronger and lighter steels. See id.; see also Steel: The
2000]
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quality of air in America's steelmaking cities improved dramati-
cally.46 The United States steel industry even joined forces with
thirty-two other steel companies from fifteen nations to design the
lightest possible steel car body with enhanced fuel efficiency. 47
Both domestically and internationally, the steel industry plans to
continue these efforts to make the steelmaking process more envi-
ronmentally friendly in an economically feasible way. 48
III. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
A. Events Preceding the Kyoto Conference
The greenhouse effect and other environmental issues have re-
cently become a global concern. 49 The United Nations General As-
sembly responded to these concerns by creating the Inter-
Environmental Choice, supra note 44 (discussing steel industry's environmental im-
provements in recent years).
46. See Steel: The Green Choice, supra note 44 (stating Environmental Protection
Agency recognizes that steel cities' air quality in United States is improved).
47. See id. (explaining United States combined environmental efforts with for-
eign nations in effort to address emissions problem). Steel companies from vari-
ous countries are attempting to design a lighter steel car body to triple the average
fuel economy. See id. The steel industry is also seeking to reduce the weight of
steel in suspension systems and closure systems (i.e. doors, trunk lids, etc.). See
Global Climate and Steel, supra note 29 (discussing steel industry projects aimed at
reducing energy consumption).
48. See Global Climate and Steel, supra note 29 (discussing United States steel
industry's commitment to continue its environmental efforts in future). The steel
industry "believes that with a proper environment for encouraging investment,
support for voluntary actions, and other incentives and inducements, further sig-
nificant progress can be made in several general areas." Id. First, it will focus on
achieving a more effective utilization of materials through the reduction of gener-
ated scrap and substitution of fuels where feasible. See id. Secondly, it will look to
improve energy efficiency by "eliminating processing bottlenecks and employing
more direct hot charging of rolling mills and near-net-shape casting." Id. Thirdly,
it will develop new technology through improvements in the coke processing facili-
ties. See id. Lastly, the industry will continue to advance steel as the material of
choice. See id.
49. See CLAUSSEN & McNEILLY, supra note 11, at 5-6 (discussing how green-
house effect evolved into global concern). For a discussion of the greenhouse
effect, see supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text. In light of growing environ-
mental concerns, the First World Climate Conference convened in 1979. SeeBoon-
charoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 919. The goal of this conference was to examine
how climate changes could be avoided by changing human activities. See id. In
1990, the Second World Climate Conference took place. See id. One hundred and
thirty-seven countries and the European Community took part in this conference.
See id. at 920. Several principles from this conference were incorporated into the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change "including the impor-
tance of sustainable development and recognition of climate change as a shared
problem among parties with 'common but differentiated responsibilities."' Id.
The greenhouse effect problem is a "global problem that demands a global solu-
tion because emissions from one country can impact the climate in all other coun-
tries." CLAUSSEN & McNEILLY, supra note 11, at 5.
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governmental Negotiating Change.50 In 1992, this Committee cre-
ated a treaty called the Framework Convention on Climate Change
(Rio Treaty). 51 The Rio Treaty embodies three themes: "(1) em-
phasis on achieving reductions early enough 'to allow ecosystems to
adapt naturally to changes in climate;' (2) emission reduction activ-
ities executed without endangering food production; and (3) ef-
forts to stave off the adverse effects of climate change in harmony
with established principles of sustainable economic develop-
ment. ' 52 The Rio Treaty mandates developed countries voluntarily
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to the level present in
1990. 53 However, a country that fails to reduce its emission faces no
50. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 8 (discussing creation of inter-
national panel and underlying rationale for its creation). Between February 1991
and May 1992, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change met five times. See id. As a result of these meet-
ings, the Committee on Climate Change, opened for signature on May 9, 1992. See
id.
51. See PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 1 (discussing creation of inter-
national environmental treaty created by international panel). The Framework
Convention on Climate Change (Rio Treaty) was the first international treaty to
address global environmental concerns. See id. It contains twenty-six Articles. See
Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 7. It was a voluntary agreement to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. See id. at vii. It is commonly referred to as the Rio
Treaty because the conference was held in Rio de Janeiro. See generally Energy
Information Administration, supra note 19, at xi. The Rio Treaty's goal was to
reduce emission of gases among developed countries. See Sparber & O'Rourke,
supra note 11, at vii. The ultimate objective was as follows:
To achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmos-
phere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a
time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate
change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 1 (quoting Article 2 of Rio Treaty). The
goals were to be met by 2000. See id. Over one hundred and seventy nations,
including the United States, signed and ratified the treaty. See Sparber &
O'Rourke, supra note 11, at vii. The Rio Treaty formed the foundation to future
international environmental agreements and negotiations regarding greenhouse
gas emissions. See PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 1.
52. Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 921 (discussing themes embodied
in Rio Treaty).
53. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at vii (discussing aim of voluntary
reductions was to decrease emission of excess greenhouse gases). The voluntary
reductions of the greenhouse gases were only applicable to the developed coun-
tries. See id. The goal was to encourage countries to reduce their emissions level to
the level emitted in 1990. See id. Eugene Trisko, attorney for the United Workers
of America of the AFL-CIO, claimed "the parties to the Rio Treaty made a funda-
mental error when they agreed to negotiate legally binding carbon restrictions on
the United States and other industrialized countries while simultaneously agreeing
to exempt high grown developing countries like China, Mexico, Brazil, and Korea
from any new carbon reduction commitments." Global Warming Briefing (visited
Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.ncpa.org-/press/transcript/globalwm/globall 4 .html>.
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consequences because the Rio Treaty's emissions requirements are
not binding.54 Over 170 nations, including the United States,
signed and ratified this treaty. 55
In 1995, the parties signatory to the Rio Treaty attended the
first conference in Berlin.5 6 Concerned that voluntary reduction
provisions were too lenient to effectuate results, the parties decided
to support mandatory reductions. 57 They enacted the Berlin Man-
date that declared another meeting in December 1997, in Kyoto,
Japan to negotiate mandatory reductions. 58
54. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at vii (discussing reductions are
voluntary and, therefore, countries are not bound to meet mandates).
55. See id. The United States signed and ratified the Rio Treaty in the Senate
in October 1992. See PRESIDEr's POuCIES, supra note 11, at 1. After this treaty,
several world scientists continued to study the environmental and economic effects
of climate change. See id. In 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change issued a study concluding that "the balance of evidence suggests that there
is a discernible human influence on global climate." Id. (quoting CLIMATE CHANGE
1995, THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996)). The panel suggested that temperatures would increase by 1.8'
to 6.3' F. See PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 2. The rise in temperature
will cause "coastal damage from rising sea levels, greater frequency of severe
weather events, shifts in agricultural growing conditions from changing weather
patterns, threats to human health from increased range and incidence of diseases,
changes in availability of freshwater supplies, and damage to ecosystems and bi-
odiversity." Id. at 1. This study prompted creation of the Protocol. See id.
56. See Sparber & O'Rouke, supra note 11, at 8 (discussing first international
-conference following Rio Treaty to address environmental concerns); see also
Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 921 (discussing conference held in Berlin
to address global environmental concerns). At this conference, the Berlin Man-
date was adopted. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 8. The conference
parties "stressed the importance of firm national commitments to [greenhouse
gas] emission reductions." Id. The parties appointed a special Ad Hoc Group to
oversee the Berlin Mandate. See id. The Ad Hoc Group met in 1995 to discuss
what developed nations could do to reduce their emissions. See id.; see also Boon-
chareon & Gase, supra note 19, at 922 (discussing adoption of Berlin Mandate and
Ad Hoc Group's oversight role).
57. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 8. Through the adoption of the
Geneva Ministerial Declaration at the Second Conference of the Parties, environ-
mental ministers called on countries to enact binding national emission-reduction
goals. See id. The Declaration stated that accomplishment of the conference goals
required mandatory reductions. See id.
58. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 14 (outlining goals of meeting
to be held in Kyoto, Japan). The third conference was held December 1-11, 1997,
in Kyoto, Japan, with over 10,000 participants. See Chad Carpenter et al., Report of
the Fourth Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change,
EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, Nov. 16, 1998, at 1-2. The United States was one
of the participants of the third conference. See PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note
11, at 21. The United States entered the negotiations with three primary objectives
for inclusion in the agreement: (1) "realistic targets and timetables for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions among the world's major industrial nations;" (2) "an
array of flexible, market-based approaches for reducing emissions" provided in the
agreement; and (3) "meaningful participation of key developing countries." Id.
The United States Administration claims it achieved the first two objectives and
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B. The Kyoto Protocol's Regulations
On December 10, 1997, the parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted the Protocol
after ten days of difficult negotiations. 59 The Protocol's purpose is
to "prevent dangerous interference with the climate system by limit-
ing the emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere." 60 The
Protocol captured worldwide attention because it is the "first agree-
ment that seeks to impose legally binding restrictions on the release
of environmentally harmful GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions into
the atmosphere." 61 Annex I parties include developing countries
"made an important down payment on the third objective." Id.; see Sparber &
O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 9 (discussing Kyoto Conference, its goals, its accom-
plishments, and its shortcomings); Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 922
(discussing Kyoto conference and drafting of Protocol); CLAUSSEN & McNEILLY,
supra note 11, at 7 (discussing Kyoto Protocol's history). For a discussion of events
occurring between the Berlin Mandate and Kyoto, see Carpenter, supra, at 2.
59. See Brendan P. McGivern, Conference of the Parties to the Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol, 37 INT'L LEGAL MAT-RrU-S 22, 23 (Jan. 1998)
(discussing difficult journey to drafting and adopting Kyoto Protocol). The third
conference was scheduled to end on Wednesday, December 10, 1997. See Andrew
Kerr, Climate Change Campaign: Kyoto Conference: Daily Diary Dec. 11, 1997 (visited
Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.-panda.org/climate/kyoto/diary.html>. The confer-
ence continued through Wednesday night, not ending until 10:00 a.m. Thursday.
See id. The parties, however, could not complete their work. See id. For a discus-
sion of unresolved issues at Kyoto, see infra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
The agreement reached at the third conference was named "Kyoto Protocol
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change." See Sparber &
O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 2. The agreement was named after the location of the
conference, Kyoto, Japan. See id. It is referred to as the "Kyoto Protocol" for short.
See id.; see generally Kerr, supra (discussing development of Protocol and its name);
see also John Prescott, Bitain in the USA (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://
www.britaininfo.org/BlStext/FORDOM/environ/171297.htm> (discussing adop-
tion of Kyoto Protocol); Dan Dudek et al., Cooperative Mechanisms Under the Kyoto
Protocol - The Path Forward (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.edf.org/pubs/Re-
ports/PathForward/index.html> (discussing conference held in Kyoto, Japan and
adoption of Protocol); Climate Change, 29 ENVTrL. L. REP. 10055, (publication page
reference not available) (Jan. 1999) (discussing Kyoto conference and Protocol
drafted).
60. McGivern, supra note 59, at 22 (declaring Protocol's purpose was to draft
binding obligations for emissions reductions). The Protocol was a formal recogni-
tion that emissions reductions decided at previous Framework Convention Confer-
ence were not adequate to limit atmospheric concentrations and that parties were
not going to voluntarily meet targets for year 2000. See CLAUSSEN & McNEILLY,
supra note 11, at 9 (discussing goal of reaching 1990 emissions level and noting
that such level would not be attained by 2000).
61. Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 917 (depicting Protocol as unprec-
edented due to its imposition of legally binding obligations for emissions reduc-
tions). The agreement is the subject of much controversy because of its
significance. See id. Some commentators believe that the Protocol is "one of the
most significant advances in environmental regulation." Id. Others believe that
the regulations were imposed too late. See id. There are also those who completely
object to the ratification of the treaty because they fear the Protocol "threatens the
2000]
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and those countries that are in a transition to a market-based econ-
omy.6 2 The countries must meet the mandatory reductions and
show "demonstrable progress toward achieving their goals" between
the years 2008 and 2012.63
The Protocol establishes two different baselines for emissions
reductions, and from these baselines, the Protocol establishes a per-
centage of overall gas emissions reductions (ranging between
ninety-two and one hundred percent).64 For carbon dioxide, meth-
U.S. economy and is unfair to developed nations." Id. United States Senator Kerry
noted, "Whatever the deficiencies, the fact that an agreement could even be
reached indicates that most nations are sufficiently convinced of the threat of
global warming to want to take action." Id. at 917-18.
62. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 9 (describing Protocol's place-
ment of mandatory reductions on Annex I countries). The conference refers to
the developed countries as Annex I countries. See id. The Annex I countries in-
clude: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, European Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of
America. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, Annex B, 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 22, 43 [hereinaf-
ter Kyoto Protocol]; see generally CLAUSSEN & McNEILLY, supra note 11 (discussing
binding emissions reduction obligation placed on Annex I countries); McGivern,
supra note 59, at 24 (discussing regulations for Annex I countries agreed upon in
Protocol); Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 9 (discussing regulations placed
upon Annex I countries and absence of regulations placed upon all other coun-
tries). "Parties undergoing the process of transition to a market economy" mainly
include countries in Eastern Europe. See McGivern, supra note 59, at 24.
63. See CLAUSSEN & McNEILLY, supra note 11, at 7 (discussing mandatory emis-
sions regulations placed upon Annex I countries); see also Sparber & O'Rourke,
supra note 11, at 9 (discussing mandatory emissions reductions agreed upon at
Kyoto conference); Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 925 (discussing Proto-
col's five percent mandatory reductions to be achieved by 2008). Emissions targets
are stated in terms of an average over five years, as opposed to meeting specific
targets each year. See PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 23. This attempts to
permit a country to meet its obligations in a cost effective way. See id. Averaging
emissions reductions, furthermore, can mitigate the effects of fluctuations in the
business market and energy demand. See id. at 23-24.
The countries must make demonstrable progress by year 2005. See Kyoto Pro-
tocol, supra note 62, art. I, 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 32. Article 2, paragraph 2
states, "Each party included in Annex I shall, by 2005, have made demonstrable
progress in achieving its commitments under this Protocol." See Kyoto Protocol,
supra note 62, art. III, 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 33.
64. See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 925 (explaining obligations
and defining baselines for emissions reductions). The Protocol decided that
rather than stating a uniform reduction target for all the "Annex I" countries, it
would set a certain percent reduction for each country. See id. Under this scheme,
some parties are hit with major reductions, while others are permitted to increase
their emissions. See id. For example, Australia is permitted to rise eight percent
above its 1990 level of emissions, whereas Europe must decrease its emissions to
eight percent below its 1990 level of emissions. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra
note 11, at 9. Europe will achieve this reduction under a program called the "Eu-
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ane, and nitrous oxide, the base year is 1990.65 For hydrofluoro-
carbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride, however, the
country can choose either 1990 or 1995 as the baseline. 66 The Pro-
tocol permits countries with transitional economies to choose a dif-
ferent base year than 1990 for calculating emissions reductions.67
ropean Bubble." See id. The European Bubble Program allows countries that are
poorer to emit significantly more greenhouse gases, while other countries in the
bubble reduce their emissions level further below the mandated level to compen-
sate for the poorer countries' permitted emissions. See id. at 9-10. For example,
Spain and Portugal will be permitted to emit greenhouse gases, whereas Great
Britain and Germany are expected to reduce their emissions significantly more
than the mandated eight percent below their 1990 level. See id. As a result of
Great Britain switching to natural gas for production of electricity, and Germany
shutting down most of its heavily polluting power plants, both have already made
significant progress in decreasing emissions. See id. at 10.
The Protocol's reductions were set through negotiations rather than assigning
amounts. See CLAUSSEN & McNEiLLY, supra note 11, at 8. One commentator noted
that negotiating was an important first step, but it lacked "rigorous analysis or ob-
jective criteria." See id. at 8. The commentator further noted that "a framework for
future adjustments and amendments that will be equitable and acceptable to all
nations remains to be developed." Id.
65. See Boonchareon & Gase, supra note 19, at 925 (describing Protocol's
baseline emissions reductions for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide);
Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 9 (describing baselines for mandatory regu-
lations in Protocol). The regulations mandated countries to reduce emissions of
carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide to a specified percent below the 1990
level of emissions. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 9. Article 3 of the
Protocol states:
[T]he parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure
that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions
of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned
amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and
reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the
provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions
of such gases by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels in the commitment
period 2008 to 2012.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 62, art. II, 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 33. The gases
listed in Annex A are: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluoro-
carbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexflouride. See id. at Annex A.
66. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 9 (discussing Protocol's differ-
ing treatment depending upon type of gas regulated). The Protocol establishes a
choice of baselines for the other three synthetic gases because the gases were only
recently created. See id. The Protocol states, "Any party included in Annex I may
use 1995 as its base year for hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hex-
afluroride." Kyoto Protocol, supra note 62, art. III, 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 33.
67. See McGivern, supra note 59, at 25 (discussing Protocol's allowance of vary-
ing base year for countries with economies in transition). The countries consid-
ered to fall within the "transition to a market economy" included the European
nations of the former Soviet Union and the countries of the former Eastern Bloc.
See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 10. These countries are given greater
flexibility because their economies are considerably weaker than the other coun-
tries. See id. Article 3.5 provides:
The parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a
market economy whose base year or period was established pursuant to
decision 9/CP.2 of the Conference of the Parties at its second session
20001
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For all countries, the target reductions are applicable to the total
greenhouse gas emissions - not specific reductions for specific
gases. 68
The Protocol requires the United Sates to reduce emissions
seven percent below its 1990 level. 69 In actuality, this seven percent
reduction is quite extreme. In 1996, the United States was nine per-
cent above its 1990 level and it is estimated the United States will be
thirty-four percent above its 1990 level in 2010.70 Therefore, what
at first glance appears to be a seven percent reduction may actually
be a forty-one percent reduction. 71  Such a mandate is
unprecedented. 72
shall use that base year or period for the implementation of their commit-
ments under this Article. Any other party included in Annex I undergo-
ing the process of transition to a market economy which has not yet
submitted its first national communication under Article 12 of the Con-
ference may also notify the Conference of the Parties serving as the meet-
ing of the Parties to this Protocol that it intends to use an historical base
year or period other than 1990 for the implementation of its commit-
ments under this Article 1.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 62, art. III, 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 33-34.
68. See PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supa note 11, at 24 (explaining Protocol's regu-
lations are applicable to total greenhouse gas emissions). Reducing total green-
house gases, as opposed to each gas having a separate regulation standard, allows
countries to choose which and how much of each gas it wants to reduce. See id.
Countries can use this to their advantage and choose to reduce a gas that emissions
are cheapest to reduce. See id.
69. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supa note 11, at 9 (discussing Annex I countries'
obligations under Protocol in comparison with non-Annex I countries). Annex B
of the agreement provides a percentage of quantified emissions limits from a base
year for the various parties. See Kyoto Protocol, supa note 62, Annex B, 37 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS at 43. The United States' reduction commitment is ninety-three
percent. See id. The United States has one of the highest percentage reductions
mandated. See id.
70. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GAP ANALYSIS 1 & 7
(June 1998) (illustrating extremity of United States reductions). The United
States Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported in 1996 that the United
States was nine percent above the 1990 level of emissions. See id. The EIA further
predicted that the United States' emissions would rise to 34% above the 1990 level
by 2010. See id. The Clinton Administration claims that implementation of the
Protocol will not greatly impact the United States. See id. The Business Round-
table, however, criticizes the Clinton Administration's predictions about the Proto-
col, saying that the Clinton Administration did not take into account the probable
increase of emissions if business as usual continued in the United States. See id. at
8. The Clinton Administration premised its analysis on a twenty-six percent reduc-
tion, leaving the remaining fifteen percent mandated reduction unexplained. See
id.
71. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 7 (discussing severity of Proto-
col's regulations for United States).
72. See id. (explaining mandated reductions placed upon United States are
unprecedented in environmental regulation). For a discussion of why the seven
percent is more than what it seems, see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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2. Developing Countries Exempt from Mandatory Reductions
Some developing countries, such as China, India, Mexico, and
Brazil, are exempt from the Protocol's mandates.73 Although the
Protocol does not subject them to specific requirements, it does re-
quire them to be committed to attempting to achieve sustainable
development, and it allows them to participate in the clean develop-
ment mechanism.7 4
In a campaign to solicit participation in emissions reductions
from these otherwise exempt countries, the United States adminis-
tration posits that developed countries may voluntarily bind them-
selves to emissions reductions by amending the Protocol. 75 Under
such an assumption, the United States is campaigning for develop-
ing countries' participation. 76 The benefit of acquiring this partici-
pation is that these countries could then participate in the
emissions trading program, which allows Annex I countries to
purchase emissions budgets from each other.77
However, the voluntary commitment of developing countries is
unlikely for two reasons. First, voluntary commitment is not legally
binding.78 Article 3 of the Protocol states that emission-reduction
73. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 5 (discussing exclusion of de-
veloping countries from mandatory regulations under Protocol). The exclusion of
developing countries stems from the Berlin Mandate, which occurred prior to the
conference held at Kyoto. See id. In the Berlin Mandate, an agreement to negoti-
ate the Protocol, the parties agreed to exclude developing countries from
mandatory reductions while implementing mandatory reductions for developed
countries. See id. Approximately 137 nations are excluded from obligations under
the Protocol. See id.
74. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 62, art. X, 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERAL.S at 36-
37 (provision encouraging developing countries to take action); PRESIDENT'S POLI-
CIES, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing developing countries' role in Protocol).
75. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 16 (citing Eizenstat, House
Energy and Power Subcommittee hearing, Mar. 4, 1998) (discussing United States'
proposal to amend Annex B of Protocol to bind non-Annex I countries).
76. See PPESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing President Clin-
ton's goal to obtain developing countries' participation in binding regulations
under Protocol). In addition to obtaining meaningful participation by the devel-
oping countries, the Clinton Administration is also striving to achieve effective im-
plementation of rules for international trading, the Clean Development
Mechanisms and joint implementation. See id. For a discussion of these programs,
see infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
77. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 16 (discussing "carrot" for de-
veloping countries in obtaining voluntary participation of non-Annex I countries).
For a discussion of the emissions trading program, see infra notes 88-90 and ac-
companying text.
78. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 16 (questioning whether
Amendment to Annex B would bind developing countries).
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commitments bind only Annex I countries.79 Because a developing
country is not an Annex I country, any commitments it makes are
not binding under Article 3.80 The amendment to the Protocol,
therefore, is only a mere gesture toward procuring voluntary partic-
ipation.81 Second, the parties are foreclosed from amending the
Protocol because it is considered a final agreement.82 Therefore,
the parties to the Protocol may not amend it until after it enters
into force.83 The Protocol is unlikely, however, ever to enter into
force because the United States Senate refuses to ratify the agree-
ment without a mandatory reduction provision for developing
countries. 84 Therefore, the problem is circular: the parties cannot
amend the Protocol until it enters into force, yet the Protocol can-
not enter into force without the amendment. Therefore, develop-
ing countries' participation will have to be accomplished through
negotiations of a supplemental agreement.85 These negotiations
are unlikely because China and other developing countries oppose
even voluntary commitments. 86
79. See id. (discussing effect of Article 3 of Protocol on Annex I countries).
Article 3 provides, The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly,
ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of
the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts."
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 62, art. III, 37 Ir, r'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 33. No similar
provision exists for a developing country voluntarily binding itself to regulations of
the Protocol. See id.
80. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 62, Annex B, 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERILS at
43 (stating only Annex I countries are bound to regulations under Article 3).
81. See BUSINEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 16 (explaining that amend-
ment to Protocol may accomplish little).
82. See id. (stating, "Protocol is a final agreement that may only be amended
by the Parties to the Protocol after it enters into force through procedures estab-
lished in the agreement").
83. See id. (discussing procedure and timetable for amending Protocol). The
amendment to the Protocol, after it enters into force, would come too late because
the United States Senate will not ratify any agreement that does not subject devel-
oping countries to mandatory regulations. See infra note 109 and accompanying
text (discussing Byrd-Hagel Resolution which establishes limits to ratifying Proto-
col). Since the United States' ratification is needed for the treaty to enter into
force, the Protocol will not be implemented. See id. Therefore, passing an amend-
ment to gain developing countries' participation would be futile. See id.
84. See infra note 107 (discussing United States Senate's refusal to ratify Proto-
col unless it satisfies Byrd-Hagel resolution).
85. See BUSINEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 6 (discussing Clinton Adminis-
tration's suggestion that parties may negotiate a supplemental agreement to gain
participation of developing countries). One problem with negotiating a supple-
mental agreement is that it provides parties with an opportunity to "revisit their
favored policies." See id.
86. See Carpenter, supra note 58, at 4 (discussing developing countries' oppo-
sition to voluntarily binding themselves to obligations where in absence of agree-
ment would be free from emissions reductions obligations).
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3. Flexibility Mechanisms in the Protocol
Included in the Protocol is a number of mechanisms to ensure
attainment of emission-reduction obligations in the most cost effec-
tive way.8 7 One such mechanism is the allowance of emissions trad-
ing among the countries. 88 Article 6 of the Protocol permits
"developed nations to either transfer to or acquire from any other
participating developed nation excess greenhouse gas emission
units."8 9 The emissions trading program permits Annex I countries
to purchase an emissions budget of another Annex I country where
it would be cheaper than undertaking the reduction in one's own
country.9 0 Another mechanism that permits countries to reduce
87. See PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 23 (discussing Protocol's built
in flexibility "market based provisions designed to permit our environmental
objectives to be accomplished at least cost"); see also Dudek, supra note 59 (discuss-
ing flexibility built into Protocol's regulations to assist parties' compliance in most
cost effective way).
88. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 22 (discussing emissions trad-
ing system and how it "embraces free-market principles with all major global
emitters").
89. Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 25. Article 6 of the Protocol
provides:
For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party
included in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such
Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing
anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic remov-
als by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy, provided
that:
(a) Any such project has the approval of the Parties involved;
(b) Any such project provides a reduction in emissions by sources, or an
enhancement of removals by sinks, that is additional to any that would
otherwise occur;
(c) It does not acquire any emission reduction units if it is not in compli-
ance with its obligations under Articles 5; and
(d) The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental to
domestic actions for the purposes of meeting commitments under Article
3.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 62, art. VI, 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 35. This emis-
sions trading program allows countries to sell extra reduction credits in the event
that they have decreased emissions greater than mandated. See Sparber &
O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 25. A country that did not meet their mandatory re-
ductions could buy those excess reduction units. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra
note 11, at 25; see also BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 24 (discussing emis-
sions trading program provided in Protocol and its unresolved problems). The
following issues remain unexplored with respect to the emissions trading program:
what is an emissions credit, who is permitted to make trades, what institutions
would be required, who would fund the mechanisms and institutions, and how
monitoring and compliance would operate. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note
70, at 25.
90. See McGivern, supra note 59, at 26 (explaining purpose of emissions trad-
ing program and how it operates). The issue of emissions trading nearly destroyed
the conference in Kyoto. See id. The United States strongly favored emissions trad-
ing because it would allow the United States to achieve its mandated reductions in
2000]
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their emissions without doing so internally is the joint implementa-
tion program. 91 The joint implementation program permits a
country to earn reduction credits when it works on certain projects
to reduce emissions in other developed countries. 92 To earn reduc-
tions, a project must (1) have approval of the parties involved and
(2) provide "a reduction in emissions by sources, or an enhance-
ment of removals by sinks, that is additional to any that would
otherwise occur."9 3 A third mechanism is the clean development
mechanism. 94 This mechanism is similar to the joint implementa-
tion program, but under the clean development mechanism, a de-
veloped country undertakes an emissions reduction program in a
developing country and a responsibility to meet additional require-
ments in order to qualify for the earning of reduction credits.95 Fi-
nally, the Protocol provides for the use of sinks to offset emissions. 96
a more cost-effective manner. See id. China and 77 other developing countries
strongly opposed emissions trading. See id. The Clinton Administration supports
United States companies' participation in this program. See PRESIDENT'S POLICIES,
supra note 11, at 26.
91. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 62, art. VI, 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 35;
see also BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 23-24 (discussing joint implementa-
tion and unresolved issues regarding how it will work). Joint implementation
"[r]efers to two Parties working together and sharing technology to reduce GHG
[greenhouse gas] emissions in both nations." Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11,
at 31. Under the joint implementation plan, both countries receive credit for re-
ducing emissions. See id. The United States promotes this program as enticement
for developing countries to get more involved in implementing the goals of the
Protocol. See id.
92. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 25-26 (discussing joint imple-
mentation program and unresolved issues concerning implementation of pro-
gram); see also BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 23 (discussing problems
surrounding joint implementation program due to unresolved issues).
93. McGivern, supra note 59, at 26 (discussing requirements for country to
earn reduction credits under joint implementation program).
94. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 27 (explaining clean develop-
ment mechanism and how it differs from joint implementation program); see also
McGivern, supra note 59, at 26 (discussing operation of clean development mecha-
nism); PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at 35 (explaining operation of clean
development mechanism and how it is cost saving device).
95. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 27 (comparing joint imple-
mentation program with clean development mechanism). Article 12 of the Proto-
col places three restrictions on developed countries utilizing the clean
development mechanism: (1) "emission reductions achieved through CDM [clean
development mechanism] may only be used to satisfy a 'part' of a country's reduc-
tion commitments;" (2) "only reductions that are 'certified by operational entities'
yet to be identified or created can be used to satisfy reduction commitments;" and
(3) "only projects that result in 'real, measurable, and long-term benefits' may be
included and then only if such reductions are 'additional to any that would occur
in the absence of the certified project."' BuSINEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at
27.
96. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 13 (defining and explaining
use of sinks according to regulations of Protocol). The Protocol permits the use of
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A sink is something that captures carbon dioxide from the air and
then stores it for a sustained period of time. 97 Countries get credit
for the use of sinks only in afforestation, reforestation, and defores-
tation activities. 98
C. The Ratification Debate Within the United States
1. Wen the Protocol will Enter Into Force
The Protocol will enter into force ninety days after the fifty-
fifth nation signs and ratifies it.99 The fifty-five nations that ratify
the Protocol, however, must include enough Annex I Parties to rep-
resent fifty-five percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for
1990.100 Therefore, the larger Annex I countries must ratify the
Protocol in order for it to enter into force. 10 1 Some say the United
human-induced forestry-related activities to offset emissions. See id. at 14. Trees
and plants can be used as carbon sinks. See id. at 13. If not properly managed,
however, carbon sinks can be a source of carbon emissions. See id. Fires, insect
infestation and decay may cause plants and trees to emit carbon, instead of absorb-
ing it. See id. Although oceans are major sinks, the Protocol does not mention
them as such. See id. The United States favors the inclusion of sinks because it
provides a low cost method of reducing emissions while encouraging afforestation
and reforestation. See id.
97. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 26.
98. See id. (discussing limitations of sinks as cost saving device). The Protocol
limits sink use to only sinks "that provide 'net changes' in carbon dioxide emis-
sions." Id. Carbon emissions resulting from forestry work will be counted against
the amount of carbon that is observed. See id. Examples of such uses are harvest-
ing and tractor use. See id.
99. See id. at 23 (discussing timetable of implementation of Protocol). Article
25 of the Protocol provides:
This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on
which not less than 55 Parties to the convention, incorporating Parties
included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 percent of
the total carbon dioxide emissions for the year 1990 of the Parties in-
cluded in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, ac-
ceptance, approval or accession.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 62, art. XXV, 37 INT'L LEGAL MIATERiALs at 4142. When
a country signs the Protocol, the "country indicates that it will refrain from taking
actions in contravention of the purpose of the treaty and that it will abide in good
faith by the terms of the treaty when it comes into force." Booncharoen & Gase,
supra note 19, at 929.
100. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 62, art. XXV, 37 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at
42 (establishing requirement in addition to 55 nation participation requirement to
further ensure emissions reductions meet Protocol's goals).
101. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 23 (discussing 55% require-
ment in relation to its effect on reality). Russia and the United States account for
the majority of the 1990 emissions, as a result, either the United States or Russia
need to sign and ratify the treaty in order for the signatory parties to meet the 55%
requirement. See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 929. The United States
accounted for 35% of the 1990 emissions, whereas Russia emitted only 15%. See id.
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States must sign and ratify the agreement because it is the largest
emitter of carbon dioxide.10 2
Each country has a different process for signature and ratifica-
tion. 03 The United States follows the process found in Article II of
the United States Constitution, which states that the President
"shall have Power, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, to make Treatises, provided that two-thirds of the Senators
Present concur. ' 104 President William Clinton completed the first
step of the process by signing the Protocol on November 12,
1998.105 To complete the second step, two-thirds of the Senate
102. See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 929 (discussing necessity of
United States ratification of Protocol for it to be put into force); see also Sparber &
O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 23 (discussing necessity of inclusion of larger Annex I
countries).
103. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 23 (stating "process of signa-
ture and ratification are different for each country").
104. Id. (quoting United States Constitution). Article II of the United States
Constitution grants the President the power to make treaties as long as two-thirds
of the Senate concur. See id.
105. See Carpenter, supra note 58, at 22 (discussing President Clinton's sign-
ing of Protocol). President Clinton signed the Protocol in New York City at the
same time the Fourth Conference on Climate Control was being held in Buenos
Aires, Argentina. See id. The Clinton Administration hoped that signing the Proto-
col would have a positive effect on the Conference occurring in Buenos Aires. See
Climate Change, supra note 59. Vice President of the United States, Al Gore, re-
leased a statement on November 12, 1999, which provided:
Our signing today of the Kyoto Protocol reaffirms America's commitment
to meeting our most profound environmental challenge - global cli-
mate change. U.S. Leadership was instrumental in achieving a strong
and realistic agreement in Kyoto-one that couples ambitious environ-
mental targets with flexible market mechanisms to meet those goals at
the lowest possible cost .... We are confident that in time the nations of
the world will arrive at a course that maintains strong and sustainable
economic growth, respects the needs and aspirations of all nations, and
protects future generations from the threat of global warming.
Gore Statement on U.S. Signing of Kyoto Protocol (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://
www.pcusa.org/wo/alerts/kyoto.htm>. Many people criticized President Clinton
for signing the Protocol because several issues were unresolved and more impor-
tantly, key participation from developing countries was not gained. See Statement of
NMA President and CEO Richard L. Lawson Concerning the Administration's Signing of
the Kyoto Climate Change Treaty (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.nma.org/KP-
Signing.html> (discussing negative effects of United States' signing on to Protocol
prematurely). Richard Lawson, National Maintenance President and Chief Execu-
tive Officer, said, "[s]igning the treaty before the rules of the game are known is
tantamount to signing a blank check and handing it to the developing world." Id.
House Majority Whip Delay expressed concern that the President signing the Pro-
tocol would harm negotiations in Congress. See Delay Says Fast Track, IMF Funding
Prospects Are 'Dead, CONG. DALY (Jan. 27, 1998) available in 1998 WL 6604644. Sen-
ator Hagel and others criticized the President for signing the Protocol because it
was in direct contradiction of the Senate's advice, in light of the Byrd-Hagel Reso-
lution. See Carpenter, supra note 58, at 23. Eighteen thousand scientists signed a
petition in response to President Clinton's signing the Protocol because they be-
lieved the terms "would harm the environment, hinder the advance of science and
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must ratify the Protocol.10 6 However, it is unlikely that the Senate
will ratify it in its present form because it fails to meet the require-
ments of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution.10 7 Due to the unlikeliness of
technology and damage the health and welfare of mankind." John Fulton Lewis,
"Petition Project" (visited Feb. 1, 1999) (quoting Project Petition) <http://
www.allianceforamerica.org/0698003.htm>. The scientists further claim the data
the United Nations relied upon was inaccurate and current data does not support
its findings. See id.; see also Lawrence Morahan, U.S. Signs Global Warming Pact, Ig-
nores Costs (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http:www.conservativenews.org/indepth/
archive/199811/IND19981113c.html> (discussing events surrounding President
Clinton's signing of Protocol and likely events to follow).
106. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 23 (discussing United States
process for signature and ratification of Protocol). Legal experts have debated
whether the Senate needs to ratify the Protocol because it is an amendment to the
1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change Treaty, which the Senate has al-
ready ratified. See id. at 23. This debate is trivial because the Clinton Administra-
tion has said it will seek the advice and consent of the Senate regardless of the
legal issues. See id. at 24.
107. See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 930 (discussing unlikeliness of
ratification of Protocol in United States due to its failure to meet Byrd-Hagel Reso-
lution). The Byrd-Hagel resolution was adopted in 1997. See id. Senators Robert
Byrd of West Virginia and Charles Hagel of Nebraska sponsored the bill. See id.
The resolution has two requirements for ratification of a treaty: (1) the treaty must
contain legally binding emissions reductions for developing countries during the
same compliance period as developed countries and (2) the treaty will not cause
serious harm to the United States economy. See id. "The Kyoto Protocol does not
satisfy either specification, and the Senate has stated that the treaty will not be
ratified until those conditions have been met." Id. John Passacantando, Director
of Ozone Action, a nonprofit advocacy group, stated that "[fIrom the day [the
Byrd-Hagel resolution] was passed in July, its language has shaped both the negoti-
ations over and the debate about the global warming treaty agreed to in December
1997. Now the Byrd-Hagel resolution is also likely to influence the coming Senate
debate about ratification of the treaty." Robert C. Byrd & Chuck Hagel, Taking
Exception: Advice to Heed On the Kyoto Treaty, WASH. PosT, May 6, 1998, available at
<http://www.securitypolicy.org/papers,/other/edwarm20.html> (quoting John
Passacantando). The Clinton Administration has yet to submit the Protocol to the
Senate for ratification. See id. The Clinton Administration will not submit the Pro-
tocol for ratification until developing countries agree to "meaningful participa-
tion." See Global Warming, 19 No. 7 Jud./Legis. Watch Rep. 5, at 6 (July 1998).
Stuart Eizenstat, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, claims the adminis-
tration will likely submit the Protocol to the Senate in March 1999, because it is
likely that "meaningful" developing country participation will be achieved by then.
See Administration Aide Says Kyoto Pact To Be Offered In '99, CONG. DAILY (Feb. 11,
1998), available at 1998 WL 6604739. The Administration does not intend to sub-
mit the Protocol to the Senate without participation from key developing coun-
tries. See id. One energy specialist predicts that any Senate action is at least two
years away. See Pamela Newman-Barnett, Senate Action On Global Warming Seen As
Unlikely, CONG. DAILY (Nov. 9, 1998), available in 1998 WL 21771682; see also Boon-
charoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 930.
Ashcroft claims:
The Administration went to the extreme to bring back an agreement
from the Kyoto Summit. The terms agreed to by the Administration
would have no chance - none, zero - of gaining ratification in the Senate.
The concessions made to other nations would cause severe damage to the
American economy, and would deprive our people of good jobs, income
2000]
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ratification in the United States, the enforcement date for the Pro-
tocol is likely to be postponed.1 0 8
2. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution and Its Effect on the Ratification
Debate
The Byrd-Hagel Resolution requires that "(1) the treaty legally
binds developing nations to reduction target within the same com-
pliance period as developed nations and (2) the treaty will cause no
serious harm to the U.S. economy."1 0 9 In its current form, the Pro-
tocol fails to meet either requirement."" °
The first prong of the Byrd-Hagel resolution requires "mean-
ingful participation" from the developing nations.'1 ' Because the
Protocol does not legally bind developing countries to mandatory
reduction, the Clinton Administration solicits developing countries
to participate voluntarily in the Protocol's requirements. 1 2 Within
this voluntary context, the participation level needed to satisfy the
"meaningful participation" prong is uncertain. 1 13  Of course,
they need to meet the needs of their families, and economic opportunity
for the next generation.
Ashcroft: President Can't Limit Sovereignty by Bypassing Treaty Debate in Senate (visited
Feb. 1, 1999) <http://senate.gov/ashcroft/4-30-98.htm>.
108. See supra note 101 (discussing difficulties Protocol faces for ratification in
United States); see also supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (discussing ne-
cessity of ratification of Protocol by United States in order for Protocol to take
effect).
109. Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 930 (discussing Byrd-Hagel reso-
lution and its effect on Protocol); Byrd & Hagel, supra note 107 (discussing re-
quirements of Byrd-Hagel resolution and its effect on environmental international
treaty and debate surrounding treaty). Some say the Byrd-Hagel Resolution
should not be given much weight because the Senate was only given "minimal
time" to research the issues prior to the vote for passing the resolution. See id.
Senators Byrd and Hagel both disagree with this assertion because the Senate had
over a month to conduct research, several hearings were held, and the senators
were given a report issued by the Foreign Relations Committee. See id. Sixty-five
senators were added as cosponsors to the bill before the vote. See id.
110. See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 930 (discussing Protocol and
its failure to comply with Byrd-Hagel resolution); see also Byrd & Hagel, supra note
107 (discussing Protocol's failure to meet Byrd-Hagel resolution and likely
outcome).
111. For a discussion of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution's requirements, see supra
note 109 and accompanying text.
112. See PRESIENT'S POLICtES, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing Clinton Adminis-
tration's effort to obtain voluntary participation of developing countries).
113. See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 932-33 (discussing uncertain-
ties of meaningful participation prong of Byrd-Hagel Resolution). Bill O'Keefe,
Vice President of the American Petroleum Institute, claims "meaningful participa-
tion" would be at least a handful of the more industrialized developing countries.
See Newman-Barnett, supra note 107. Possible countries include China, India, and
Mexico. See id. Argentina already voluntarily agreed to binding emissions reduc-
tions at the summit held in Buenos Aires. See Carpenter, supra note 58, at 22.
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whether voluntary commitments amount to "meaningful participa-
tion" is a moot issue altogether if the voluntary commitments are
not legally binding in the first place. 114
The second prong requires the Protocol to pose no serious
economic harm to the United States.11 5 The Protocol fails this
prong because of the devastating effect it will have on the United
States economy.' 6 Many economists estimate that implementation
of the Protocol will cause: (1) the U.S. gross domestic product to
decrease by $200 billion; (2) a 2.4 million reduction in available
jobs; (3) a thirty to forty percent increase in the cost of domestic
electricity and heating; (4) a sixty-cent increase in the cost of gaso-
line; (5) an increase in the cost of food, paper, steel, chemicals,
aluminum, cement and petroleum products, and all other products
that are produced with the use of energy; and (6) a $2,000 to
$4,000 per year increase in energy costs for the average family. 1 7
They also predict that revenue from state taxes will decrease by
$93.1 billion due to job and output losses attributable to lost United
States competitiveness in the global market and higher energy
costs. 1 1 8
The Clinton Administration disputes this forecast and claims
that the economic costs of the Protocol will be modest. 1 9 The Clin-
114. See Newman-Burnett, supra note 107, at 26. For a discussion of the legal
effects of countries voluntarily binding themselves to obligations, see supra notes
78-80 and accompanying text.
115. See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 932-33 (discussing second
prong of Byrd-Hagel resolution and its effect on Protocol).
116. See id. at 934 (discussing economic predictions). The economic predic-
tions are uncertain because of the ambiguities left open in the Protocol. See id.
The Senate is unlikely to ratify it because of the inability to predict its effect on the
economy. See id.; see also Warming: The High Cost of the Protocol (visited Feb. 1, 1999)
<http://www.api.org/globalclimate/wefanatimpacts.htm> (discussing effect of
Protocol on economy).
117. See Global Warming Treaty, 19 NO. 3 Jud./Legis. Watch Rep. 5, 6 (Mar.
1998); Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 934. Janet Yellen, Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors chair, predicted household energy prices will increase approxi-
mately three to nine percent and the price of gas will increase between four and
six cents per gallon. See id. at 933-34. Another report suggests energy prices will
increase 55% and gasoline prices will increase 450. See id. at 934; see also Basin
Electric News (visited Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.bepc.com/news/memburge.htm>
(discussing study illustrating economic harm caused by Protocol); Global Warming
Briefing, supra note 53 (discussing speech of attorney of United Mine Workers re-
garding economic impact of Protocol).
118. See Global Warming: The High Cost of the Protocol, supra note 116 (discussing
economic impacts).
119. See PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra 11, at i (predicting energy prices). The
President's Report concludes energy prices will increase only modestly, thus not
affecting the United States' competitiveness in the industry. See id. Although the
report recognizes that the steel industry is energy intensive, it simply states it will
not affect it substantially. See id.; see also A Small Price to Pay: US Action to Curb Global
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ton Administration's Report, and other similar reports, state that
the United States can reach its mandated reduction "with the flexi-
bility mechanisms included in the treaty, and by pursuing sound
domestic policies."'120 The President's Report estimates that emis-
sions can be reduced twenty-six percent through current climate
mitigation programs. 121 In order to meet the rest of the reduction,
the President's Report relies heavily on emissions trading, joint im-
plementation, the clean development mechanism, and the use of
sinks.122 Because the rules and procedures associated with the miti-
gation programs are not yet decided, it is difficult to estimate the
economic impact accurately. 123 Due to these uncertainties, it is un-
likely that the Senate will ratify the Protocol. 124
Because Senate ratification is unlikely, many fear that the Clin-
ton Administration will attempt to implement the regulations
through the "back door."'125 In response to this fear, Congress
Warming Is Feasible and Affordable (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.channell.
com/users/tellus/allprice.html> (claiming U.S. can meet Protocol requirements
without hurting economy).
120. PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, supra note 11, at i (discussing Clinton Administra-
tion's approach to meeting Protocol). The President announced a domestic pro-
gram in 1997 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. See id. at ii. This domestic
policy included: (a) various activities that would be implemented irrespective of
the fate of Kyoto and (b) if the Protocol was ratified, a mandatory domestic emis-
sions trading system to take effect in 2008-2012. See id.
121. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 8 (discussing Clinton Admin-
istration's projection of effect of current climate mitigation programs).
122. See id. at 7-8 (discussing President's Report).
123. See id. at 6 (claiming current gaps in Protocol make it difficult to accu-
rately assess impact on United States).
124. See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 19, at 934 (predicting Senate will
not ratify due to economic uncertainties).
125. See id. at 934-35. The Clinton Administration claims it will not imple-
ment the Protocol prior to Senate ratification. See id. at 935. Recent budget pro-
posals suggest otherwise. See id. "The 1999 budget includes a $6.3 billion package
of economic incentives for consumers and companies taking steps towards reduc-
ing [greenhouse gases]." Id. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) re-
quested an increase in its budget. See id. This increase nearly doubles current
funding used to carry out the Administration's Climate Change Initiative. See id.
EPA may further request the power to regulate carbon dioxide emissions of power
plants. See id. Currently, EPA cannot regulate carbon dioxide because it is not
considered a pollutant. See Global Warming, supra note 107, at 5. Carbon dioxide is
not considered a pollutant because it is naturally occurring when exhaled by
humans and animals. See id. Congress views these incidents as the Clinton Admin-
istration's implementing the Protocol without seeking ratification. See id. Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman, Christopher Bond, says the Senate will
not fund the Protocol treaty before it is ratified. See id. Bond discussed a bill that
prohibited funding EPA's support of the Protocol. See id. Representative John
Shimkus of Illinois claims he and many others are watching to see whether the
President will attempt to implement the Protocol through Executive Orders.
Shimkus Urges Early House Action on Financial Services, CONG. DAILY (Dec. 9, 1998),
available at 1998 WL 21771895. If the President does attempt to implement the
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passed bills prohibiting the use of federal funds to implement the
Protocol. 
126
Protocol through Executive Orders, he will likely be stopped. See Army Calls for
Budget Changes to Offset IMF Spending, CONG. DAiLY (May 20, 1998), available at 1998
WL 6605350. Representative Livingston, when asked about the Administration's
attempts to implement parts of the Protocol, responded, "If they're trying to do
through the back door what they can't do through the front, that's a clear invita-
tion for Congress to get involved." Id. Livingston said they will stop federal fund-
ing. See id.
126. See K & A Online (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.kannerandassoc.
com/S2019.htm>. On April 30, 1998, United States Senator John Ashcroft intro-
duced a bill entitled "Economic Growth and Sovereignty Protection Act" to pre-
vent federal funds from being used for "rules, regulations, or programs designed
to implement, or in contemplation of implementing, the Protocol" before it re-
ceived Senate ratification. See id. Ashcroft claims "the Administration has made it
clear that it intends to begin implementing the treaty before the Senate ratifies the
Protocol." See Ashcroft: President Can't Limit Sovereignty (visited Apr. 30, 1998)
<http://www.senate.gov/-ashcroft/4-30-98.htm>. Ashcroft further claims imple-
menting the treaty prior to Senate ratification is contrary to the Constitution and
the system of checks and balances that the United States was founded upon. See id.
"The American President is not a monarch who is able to make treaties without
oversight by the people's elected representatives. In our nation, a President is not
empowered to make treaties that unilaterally bind American sovereignty." Id.
(quoting Ashcroft). This bill will protect the "American economy, our jobs and
income, and it will uphold important constitutional values." Id.
On May 7, 1998, Mr. Knollenburg introduced a similar bill in the House of
Representatives entitled, "American Economy Protection Act." See K & A Online
(visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.kannerandassoc.com/HR3807.htm>. Ameri-
can Economy Protection Act's language prohibiting spending of federal funds to
implement the Protocol matches the bill Ashcroft introduced in the Senate. See id.
Both acts also prohibit federal agencies from "promulgat[ing] regulations to limit
the emissions of carbon dioxide . . .unless a law is enacted specifically granting
such authority." Id.
State governments are also limiting environmental agencies' ability to imple-
ment the Protocol regulations prematurely. The Governor's Office Communications
Division (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://www.state.wv.us/governor/press/ky-
oto.htm>. Governor Cecil H. Underwood of West Virginia signed legislation that
"prohibits the Division of Environmental Protection from proposing or imple-
menting rules regulating greenhouse gas emissions from industrial sites." Id. This
law will remain in effect until the United States Senate ratifies the Protocol and
Congress enacts legislation that implements the Protocol Agreement. See id. Gov-
ernor Underwood said he was happy to sign the law because he feared the effects
the Protocol will have on the economy. See id. He claims the Protocol gives other
countries an unfair advantage over the United States. See id. Governor Under-
wood also sponsored a resolution with Governor Paul Patton of Kentucky at a
southern governors' convention. See id. The resolution provided that the United
States should not sign or ratify the Protocol if it places the United States at an
economic disadvantage. See id.
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D. Events Subsequent to the Enactment of the Protocol
1. Unresolved Issues of the Protocol
The parties to the Kyoto Conference left open some key issues
for later discussion.' 27 The Protocol contains no rules or proce-
dures for its implementation.1 28 Although the Protocol permits
emissions trading, it fails to provide guidelines, methods of verifica-
tion or reporting mechanisms for the trading program.1 29 Further-
more, the Protocol does not stipulate a mechanism for determining
whether the program meets the criteria. 130 Due to scientific uncer-
tainties and the vagueness of the Protocol, it is also unclear how
accurately "sinks" can count toward emissions reductions goals.1 31
The Protocol also contains no regulations for its enforce-
ment. 3 2 The Protocol, however, does establish a review procedure
for monitoring compliance. 133 Under the Protocol's review proce-
127. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 24 (discussing issues left open
after Kyoto Conference).
128. See id. (discussing issues left open until fourth conference). The parties
agree to leave these issues open until their fourth meeting to be held in November
of 1998 in Buenos Aries. See id.
129. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 25-27 (discussing unresolved
issues). The unresolved issues in the Protocol are:
(1) what constitutes an emissions credit; (2) how initial allocation of
emissions units would be made; (3) who would be permitted to make
trades; (4) what institutions or mechanisms would be required and how
they would be funded; (5) who would bear the risks and costs of failures
in the trading system; (6) how monitoring and compliance would operate
or be enforced; (7) whether multinational companies could trade within
their own firms across international borders; (8) whether there will be a
pool of emissions reduction units available to trade and, if so, whether
there would be sufficient buyers and sellers in the marketplace to realize
any economic benefit at all.
BUSINEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 25. Most of these issues cannot be re-
solved until the Protocol enters into force. See id. at 24. Article 17 of the Protocol
directs the parties to establish the guidelines. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note
11, at 25.
130. See BUSINEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 23; Sparber & O'Rourke,
supra note 11, at 26.
131. SeeSparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 26 (describing sinks). The use
of sinks is another mechanism to help countries meet their reduction level. See id.
A sink is an item, such as grass, trees, and crops, which stores carbon dioxide. See
id. The Protocol is unclear on the use of sinks because scientists are uncertain how
much carbon dioxide items can store. See id. Therefore, it is unclear how much
credit a country will get for sinks. See id.
132. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 27. Article 18 requires the
countries to determine the enforcement procedures. See id. The enforcement can
include binding consequences for parties that are not in compliance with the regu-
lations. See id. The Protocol also requires the Conference of the Parties to prepare
procedures for verifying compliance by individual nations. See id.
133. See BUSINEss ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 20 (discussing enforcement
of Protocol and methods enacted for monitoring compliance).
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dure, each country has a system that estimates man-made emissions
of greenhouse gases, and there is an international team that reviews
compliance. 13 4 In addition to this international monitoring, the
United States plans to place specific caps on emissions from various
industries and companies. 13 5
Although the Protocol provides a method of monitoring com-
pliance, it does not specify penalties. 13 6 According to some com-
mentators, possible penalties a country could face are: (1)
exclusion from flexible mechanisms, such as emissions trading or
(2) an imposition of sanctions. 13 7 Resolution of these issues will
affect a country's decision to sign and ratify the agreement, thus
determining the fate of the Protocol. 13 8
2. International Environmental Conferences Subsequent to the
Protocol
In Buenos Aires, in November 1998, the parties to the Protocol
attended a fourth conference to begin resolving the issues that re-
mained open after the conference in Kyoto, Japan.1 39 At this con-
ference, the parties addressed many concerns regarding the
implementation of the Protocol. 140 However, none of the issues
were resolved. 141 The parties did set a two-year deadline to adopt
rules for enforcing the Protocol's terms. 142 These rules are to in-
134. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 20. "The Protocol requires
each Party to have in place a national system for the estimation of man-made emis-
sions of all greenhouse gases, and the methodologies for estimating emissions
must be accepted by the IPCC and agreed upon by the Conference of Parties." Id.
135. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 20. Most likely, the Depart-
ment of Energy, the Department of Agriculture, and EPA will play a key role in
promulgating specific regulations and monitoring compliance. See id.
136. See id. at 21. In addition to the uncertainty of the penalties on the inter-
national level, a more pressing concern is how it will be enforced in the United
States. See id. at 22. In the United States, citizens can bring suits to mandate com-
pliance with certain laws, including many environmental laws. See id. "Thus, a U.S.
citizen or party may be able to sue to enforce the U.S. commitments under the
Protocol." Id. Under this situation, the courts can enforce the regulations as op-
posed to Congress. See id.
137. See id. at 21.
138. See Sparber & O'Rourke, supra note 11, at 24 (discussing unresolved is-
sues). The unresolved issues are very important to many parties. See id. The reso-
lution of such issues will determine whether parties will sign and ratify the
Protocol. See id.
139. See Climate Change, supra note 59 (discussing Buenos Aires conference).
140. See Climate Change, supra note 59 (discussing conference held in Buenos
Aires and issues parties addressed).
141. See id.; Carpenter, supra note 58, at 1 (discussing issues addressed at
conference).
142. See Climate Change, supra note 59 (describing countries' commitments
during negotiations); Carpenter, supra note 58, at 1. The parties also showed
2000]
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clude: mechanisms to prevent parties from cheating, and the impo-
sition of strict penalties upon nations that do not meet their
obligations. 143 Furthermore, the parties set guidelines for market-
based mechanisms to make compliance with regulations more cost-
effective. 144
Despite the lack of accomplishments, the conference was not
uneventful.1 45 During the second week of the conference, the
United States and Argentina took center stage.1 46 Argentina, a de-
veloping country, broke away from the pact and agreed to under-
take voluntary commitments. 147 This event is noteworthy because it
may have cleared the path for other countries to commit to volun-
tary emissions reductions.' 48 If enough countries commit volunta-
rily to reduce their emissions, the "meaningful participation" prong
of the Byrd-Hagel resolution could be satisfied. 149 The day after
Argentina's announcement, the United States signed the Protocol
in an attempt to illustrate its firm commitment to making the Proto-
col agreement work.150
3. The Protocol Does Not Accomplish Its Purpose
If implemented, the Protocol will not result in worldwide re-
duction of energy-related emissions. 151 Recently, developing coun-
tries began taking the lead in emitting greenhouse gases.1 52 This
lead will continue because industries will move to developing coun-
strong commitments to achieving the goals of the Protocol in spite of the vast
disagreement that occurred at the conference. See id.
143. See Climate Change, supra note 59.
144. See id.
145. See id. Carpenter, supra note 58, at 22 (discussing Argentina's and United
States' actions during conference).
146. See Carpenter, supra note 58, at 22 (discussing Argentina's surprising ac-
tion to take on voluntary commitments during conference).
147. See id. at 23.
148. See id. (stressing importance of Argentina's actions). Stuart Eizenstat, at
the end of the conference, suggested that more developing countries' voluntary
commitments were soon to come. See id.
149. See id. (discussing United States Secretary of State). Stuart Eizenstat
views this participation as a pathway to commitments for developing countries. See
id. He further noted that this may be the "meaningful participation" the United
States requires for developing countries before ratification. See id.
150. See id. (discussing United States signing Protocol). The United States
signed the Protocol within 24 hours of Argentina's announcement to voluntarily
commit to emissions reductions. See id.
151. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 2 (discussing Protocol's fail-
ure to accomplish goal of reducing emissions due to its failure to include develop-
ing countries).
152. See id. (discussing developing countries' recent lead in emitting green-
house gases due to their recent industrialization).
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tries to avoid the Protocol's mandated emissions reductions. 153
The relocation will allow the industry to avoid limitations on emis-
sions, thus allowing it to emit more gases.1 54 The increase of emis-
sions in those developing countries - the new homes of relocated
industrial companies - will hinder the international efforts to com-
bat the greenhouse effect.155
V. THE PROTOCOL'S EFFECT ON THE STEEL INDUSTRY
The Protocol negatively affects the United States steel industry
in two ways: (1) the mandatory reductions make the current coke
process economically infeasible and (2) the increase in the cost of
energy makes the price of steel rise.1 5 6 These effects economically
disadvantage the United States steel industry while benefitting rival
steel companies in developing nations, such as China, India, Brazil,
and South Korea, because these rival steel companies are not
bound to the mandatory regulations of the Protocol.157 As a conse-
quence of this disadvantage in the international market place, steel
production will shift to developing nations.is1 As more production
shifts, the more American steel plants will close down and the more
jobs will be lost.159 The Protocol will also cause the steel industry's
independent efforts to decrease pollution and invest in energy-say-
153. See id. (discussing steel industry's shift to developing countries to avoid
added cost of environmental regulations).
154. See id. at 19.
155. See id. (examining effects of Protocol). Studies indicate that there is a
possibility of a 30% shift of the steel industry to developing countries. See Global
Climate and Steel, supra note 29, at 4.
156. See Telephone Interview with Robert Hoover, supra note 28 (discussing
Protocol's impact on steel industry); Telephone Interview with Bruce A. Steiner,
supra note 30 (discussing Protocol's impact on steel industry).
157. See A Climate for Change (visited Jan. 1, 1999) <http://www.amm.com/
ref/hot/climate.htm> (discussing how Kyoto Protocol benefits rival steel compa-
nies in other countries); Jobs, Economy at Stake Should U.S. Sign U.N. Climate Treaty
(visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.steel.org/news/untreaty.htm>. President of
the American Iron and Steel Institute, Andrew Sharkey, III, claims that applying
regulations to one country and not its competing country will give a significant
edge to the foreign competitor. See id. He also claims that the American economy
will be effected. See id. Eugene Trisk, attorney for the United Mine Workers,
claims the Protocol's creation of an uneven playing field will cause loss ofjobs in
mines, manufacturing and other sectors. See Global Warming Briefing, supra note 53.
The United States steel industry is concerned about unfair competition from
abroad. See id.
158. See Global Warming Bfiefing, supra note 53. The exclusion of mandatory
reductions to developing countries will be an incentive for companies to shift their
production and jobs from the United States to those countries. See id.
159. See id. (estimating loss of 1.7 million American jobs by year 2010).
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ing technology to screech to a halt. 160 The United States steel in-
dustry will unjustly take a stronger beating from the Protocol than
most other countries. 61 This result is inherently unfair.
A. The Protocol's Effect on the Coke Process
The coke process includes the burning of coal which produces
more carbon dioxide than any other fossil fuel.' 62 Coke ovens in
the United States have become increasingly more environmentally
sound since their invention. 63 These ovens, however, will not meet
the Protocol's mandated reductions. 164 In order to satisfy the Pro-
tocol, the coke ovens must be equipped with a "filtering process" to
eliminate particles from entering into the environment. 165 Improv-
ing the filtering process is difficult because it is not technologically
possible and, even if it is technologically possible, it is not cost-effec-
tive. 166 It is economically infeasible for the steel industry to add
such a filtering process because the coke ovens have evolved to a
point where new technology would be costly.' 67 If the steel industry
cannot meet these regulations, it will be penalized either through
fines or through verdicts against it in civil suits.' 68 Due to its inabil-
ity to comply with the mandatory regulations, the steel industry's
coke process will be shut down. 169
The steel industry's termination of the coke process will devas-
tate the industry in the United States. 170 The coal industry mines
160. See Global Climate Change, supra note 28. If the Protocol is in force, the
steel industry may implement conservative improvements, but only if they are eco-
nomically justifiable. See id.
161. See id.
162. See Global Climate and Steel, supra note 29 (discussing use of coal in steel
making process). There are no feasible alternatives to the coke process. See id.
163. See generally AssOCIATION OF IRON & STEEL ENGINEERS, supra note 32 (dis-
cussing evolution of coke process); Telephone Interview with Robert Hoover, supra
note 28 (discussing coke ovens becoming more environmentally friendly).
164. See Telephone Interview with Robert Hoover, supra note 28 (discussing
inadequacies of coke mills today).
165. See id.; ASSOCIATION OF IRON & STEEL ENGINEERS, supra note 32.
166. See Telephone Interview with Robert Hoover, supra note 28.
167. See id.
168. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 21-22 (discussing possible
civil suits). Citizens may be able to bring suits under United States law to mandate
compliance with the Protocol Regulations or domestic regulations in response to
the Protocol. See id. at 22. This would allow the courts to get involved when Con-
gress fails to act. See id. Even if the United States is not subject to strict penalties
under the Protocol, it could face penalties at home. See id.
169. See id; Telephone Interview with Robert Hoover, supra note 28.
170. See Telephone Interview with Robert Hoover, supra note 28 (discussing
how negative effects in steel industry will devastate coal industry in United States).
The Edison Electric Institute conducted a study and reported that implementation
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coal for two purposes: (1) the production of coke and (2) the pro-
duction of electricity. 17' If the steel industry no longer produces
coke, the coal industry will lose the majority of its business.172
An alternative to the coke process in the production of steel is
the use of scrap metal in mini-mills.1 73 Mini-mills, however, do not
provide an adequate substitute because: (1) mini-mills have a lower
output rate of steel per year; (2) there is a limited amount of scrap
metal, an essential ingredient for mini-mills; and (3) mini-mills can
produce only limited finished products. 174 For example, mini-mills
cannot produce steel for the production of structural members
such as i-beams. 175 Since the production of steel requires coke,
United States steel companies will have to import coke from other
countries. 176 The importation of coke will increase steel produc-
tion costs and place its foreign competitors even further ahead in
the global market place. 177
B. The Protocol's Effect on the Cost of Energy
In addition to the effects the Protocol has on the coke process,
the Protocol further impacts the steel process because it increases
the cost of energy.1 78 Under the Protocol, energy prices could rise
in two possible ways: (1) in an attempt to decrease the amount of
fossil fuels used, the government could place mandatory caps on
fossil fuel usage or (2) in order to limit consumption, the govern-
of EPA's clean air regulations and the Protocol could cost billions of dollars for the
utility industry and force the coal-fired generation out of the energy mix in order
to meet the reduction targets for carbon dioxide. See Study Says EPA Clean Air Regs
Could Cost Utilities Billions, CONG. DAILY (May 27, 1998), available in 1998 WIL
6605396 (discussing coal industry). The reduction of coal-based fire could create
a 19% gap for the needed electricity. See id. The study also indicates this cost
could not be offset by emissions trading because it has proved ineffective in the
past. See id.; see also A Climate for Change (visited Jan. 1, 1999) <http://
www.amm.com/ref/hot/climate.htm> (discussing Protocol's effect on coal
industry).
171. See Telephone Interview with Robert Hoover, supra note 28 (discussing
coal industry).
172. See id. (discussing effect of termination of coke process on coal industry).
173. See id. Mini-mills have evolved from producing only nails, rails and other
simple products, to producing sheets. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. Mini-mills are a limited alternative to the blast furnace. See id.
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ment could place a tax on fuels which would inevitably cause the
price of fuels to rise.' 79
The rise in the cost of energy dramatically affects the steel in-
dustry because the steel industry is an "energy-intensive" indus-
try.' 80 An "energy-intensive" industry produces a low-cost product
at a high-cost of energy.' 81 In the manufacturing of steel, the cost
of energy comprises fifteen to twenty percent of the total cost of
production. 182 This is considered high because the average energy
cost for manufacturing a product is three to five percent.18 3 Due to
the high component of energy in the manufacturing of steel, the
Protocol's effect on energy prices will substantially increase the to-
tal cost of producing steel in the United States. 184 If energy prices
were to double, the steel industry would suffer a five billion dollar
increase in one year.' 85 This increase in the cost of production
would shift thirty percent of the manufacturing of steel to develop-
ing countries - countries the Protocol leaves unscathed. 86 This
shift of production would result in the loss of 100,000 United States
steelmakingjobs. 187 The economic effect on the steel industry does
not stop there.1 88 It also affects consumer products that rely on
steel, such as automobiles and appliances. 8 9 Because increased
costs of production are normally allocated to the consumer, con-
179. See Telephone Interview with Bruce A. Steiner, supra note 30 (discussing
both ways energy prices would rise, and energy cap). This cap will cause an in-
crease in demand and a decrease in the supply of fuels. See id. Thus, under supply
and demand principles, the price of the product will rise. See id.
180. See Global Climate and Steel, supra note 29 (describing steel industry as
energy intensive). The steel industry accounts for between two and three percent
of the total energy consumption and about 10% of the industrial sector. See id.
181. See Telephone Interview with Bruce A. Steiner, supra note 30.
182. See Global Climate and Stee supra note 29 (discussing cost of energy in
manufacturing process).
183. See Telephone Interview with Bruce A. Steiner, supra note 30. The auto-
mobile industry is an example of an industry that is not "energy-intensive." See id.
The automobile industry's product prices are high with a low cost of energy pro-
duction. See id.
184. See id.
185. See Global Climate and Steel, supra note 29.
186. See id. (discussing shift of steel production to countries unaffected by
Protocol). History will repeat itself if steel production does shift to other coun-
tries. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
187. See Global Climate and Steel, supra note 29 (discussing loss ofjobs for steel-
workers in America).
188. See Jobs, Economy at Stake Should U.S. Sign U.N. Climate Treaty, supra note
157 (discussing various economic effects steel industry has on consumers).
189. See id.
34
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol11/iss1/5
KYOTO PROTOCOL
sumers would expect to pay more for products with steel
components. 190
V. CONCLUSION
The parties to the Protocol must determine the rules and pro-
cedures for emissions trading, credits for technology transfers,
methodologies for accounting for the role of carbon sinks, and
compliance with enforcement. 191 Without resolution of these is-
sues, it is impossible to assess accurately the economic impact the
Protocol will have on the United States steel industry. 19 2 Until the
economic impact can be accurately assessed, the United States
should not bind American steel companies to such regulations. 19 3
Furthermore, developing countries must be signatories to
mandatory reductions to prevent the Protocol from devastating the
United States steel industry.1 9 4 Without mandatory regulations ap-
plied equally across the board, the United States steel industry will
lose its competitive edge in the market place. 195 The production of
steel will shift to other countries where it is cheaper to produce.' 9 6
"Simply put, if the treaty is not global, it won't work."'
97
Heather A. Steinmiller
190. See id. (discussing various uses of steel). Steel is widely used in a variety
of ways. See id. The steel industry's costs will be passed on to the consumer be-
cause when a product is more expensive to make, it is more expensive to buy. See
id. For example, if the price of steel used in automobiles rises, the cost of the
finished product will rise. See id.
191. See Global Climate and Steel, supra note 29 (discussing steel industry's posi-
tion on Protocol). The details to these programs are important because the Clin-
ton Administration has relied upon these programs in assessing the ability of the
United States to meet the Protocol regulations. See PRESIDEr''S POLICIES, supra
note 11, at 5.
192. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 70, at 35-36 (urging President Clin-
ton not to sign Protocol due to inability to assess economic impact on United
States).
193. See id. at 35 (discussing Protocol's shortcomings). It is not possible for
every detail of the Protocol to be worked out before it is put into force. See id.
Without more knowledge on the matter, it is impossible to accurately assess the
economic sacrifices the steel industry will have to make. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. (discussing United States losing competitive edge).
196. See id.
197. Jobs, Economy at Stake Should US. Sign UN. Climate Treaty, supra note 157
(discussing severe job loss if Protocol is enacted).
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